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ABSTRACT 
 
Contract manufacturing has become a popular strategy by which the Original Product 
Manufacturer (OPM) is able to fill excess orders which are beyond his normal factory capacity.  
This strategy is very useful to enable the (OPM) to satisfy and retain his customers.  However, 
engaging a Contract Manufacturer (CM) to provide the best of services to the original product 
manufacturer can be a hazardous business.  This kind of contract engagement has recorded 
good measure of successes as well as numerous failures and betrayals.  The breach ranges from 
inability of the contract manufacturer to perform adequately to wholesale take-over of the 
product brand by the contract manufacturer.  It is therefore advisable that the original product 
manufacturer should be cautious in revealing his top business secrets, core competencies and 
intellectual property to the contract manufacturer.  As much as possible, the production contract 
should be in writing and must be made to cover all possible eventualities.  Under thoroughly-
framed contract agreement, contract manufacturers have been found to stay on course if they 
realize that a breach or betrayal will tell adversely on them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Every manufacturer of products, equipment or fixtures and fittings at sometime makes use of 
contract manufacturer to help produce the finished goods.  The outstanding advantages are that 
contract manufacturing cuts down the Original Contract Manufacturer’s costs and frees up 
capital of the company for alternative uses.  But dishonesty is today creeping into this “symbiotic 
business alliance.”  Contract manufacturers are beginning to bite the finger that feeds them.  
What should the Original Product Manufacturer (OPM) do when the Contract Manufacturer 
(CM) betrays this business trust and goes on to compete with the original product manufacturer 
on the same product brands and in the same market.  The original product manufacturer survives 
by following strategies designed to shield him from apparent dangers.  
 
 
 
WHAT IS CONTRACT MANUFACTURING 
Contract manufacturing is a special manufacturing arrangement in which the original 
manufacturer of a product or machinery contracts out (out-sources) the production of a product 
or products to an outside agent manufacturer.  That outside may be an individual or another 
organization that has the expertise to produce that product. 
 
REASONS FOR CONTRACT MANUFACTURING 
There are many reasons that could force the original producer of a product to contract out the 
production of a product brand or range of brands to an outside producer on contract basis.     
Some of these reasons are discussed below: 
1.  Low cost to the original product manufacturer:    In most cases, the original product 
manufacturer enjoys low cost under contract manufacturing arrangement.  This is due to the fact 
that the contract manufacturer may have special expertise, idle installation, adequate labourforce 
and cheap raw material he will use in the execution of the contract job.  In this scenario, the 
contract manufacturer will charge a cost that is lower than what the original product 
manufacturer will spend if he decides to produce the product himself.  A good example is where 
a tomato plantation farmer agrees to prepare first-level tomato crushing in containers for a 
tomato puree factory. 
2. Free capital available to the original product manufacturer:    When the original 
product manufacturer gives out manufacturing non contract basis, he preserves his capital and 
can use it for other businesses before it is time to pay the contract manufacturer upon the 
execution of the production contract.   
3. Too many orders to fill:   When a producer of a product receives too many orders from 
his customers to supply the product, he may decide to give out a part of the production on 
contract for two reasons.  First, he will not like to disappoint his customers by not filling the 
orders on time.  Second, chances are that he could be gaining something too from the contract 
business since, in a situation of high demand for a product, a producer can push up his price a 
little without serious complaints from his customers, while maintaining the same production cost 
for his contract manufacturer.  
4. Beating trade barriers:    In international trading, a home manufacturer can contract out 
the production of a particular product to a manufacturer in a foreign land.  This is more 
applicable to hardware products.  This practice will save the home producer the problems 
associated with international business which include; language barrier, foreign exchange, cultural 
and labour management issues.  Generally, outsourcing the entire manufacturing of a product 
allows the original product manufacturer to reduce labour costs, free up capital, and improve 
workers productivity.  The original product manufacturer can then concentrate on the things that 
most enhance a product value, such as, research and development, design improvement and 
marketing. Facilitating these gains are the contract manufacturer’s special strengths, which may 
include location in a low-wage region, gaining economies of scale, deploying special 
manufacturing prowess, and gaining exposure to the engineering and development processes of 
products he handles for other original product manufacturers.  Such exposure puts the contract 
manufacturer in a position to propose improvements to different clients’ products (Arrunada, 
2006).  
 
CONTRACT MANUFACTURING – A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 
In spite of the gains and advantages of contract manufacturing, many companies have realized 
that contract manufacturing is a two-edged sword.  For one thing, a contract manufacturer is 
privy to the business secrets, distinctive competencies and intellectual property of the original 
product manufacturer which it can leak to other clients and competitors.  For another thing, an 
ambitious upstart contract manufacturer can claim for his own business the very advantages he 
provides to the original product manufacturer.  Having manufactured the original product 
manufacturer’s product in its entirety, the contract manufacturer may decide to build his own 
brand and forge his own relationships with retailers and distributors, even including those of the 
original product manufacturer.  
 
When this wholesale betrayal of trust takes place, the original product manufacturer may find 
himself facing, not only more dangerous incumbents, but also a competitor of a new kind -    the 
once under-estimated contract manufacturer.  More painful is the fact that it was the money the 
servant (i.e. the contract manufacturer) made during his contractual relationship with his master 
(i.e. the original product manufacturer) that he (the servant) is now using to challenge his master 
(Lysons, 2003).  Although, launching a brand of his own would not be an easy undertaking for 
the contract manufacturer who betrays his master.  However, a brand identity rooted in the 
contract manufacturer’s production prowess would have immediate credibility.  Moreover, a 
contract manufacturer working for several original product manufacturers will have experience 
in making a wider range of products.  This knowledge and experience gives him the advantage of 
concentrating on the production of the most profitable products.  And his cost structure will not 
necessarily bear the burden of investments in research and development.    
 
MANAGING RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR CONTRACT MANUFACTURER 
It is usually the issue of modularization, codification of manufacturing processes, diminished 
transaction costs, among others factors that make contract manufacturing irresistible to less well-
capitalized original product manufacturers.  However, the original product manufacturer can 
manage his relationship with the contract manufacturer in such a way that the original product 
manufacturer does not become weak or the contract manufacturer himself becoming too strong.  
To manage the relationship successfully, the original product manufacturer will require to take 
the following actions: 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Modesty about revealing one’s business secrets to the contract manufacturer 
2. Caution on the part of the original product manufacturer on whom to trust 
3. Judicious degree of intimacy, loyalty and generosity towards one’s partners and 
customers. 
4. The original product manufacturer can use his surplus or extra intellectual property to 
enter new markets beyond those for his core products. . 
5. Contract manufacturer’s hidden secrets or barrier-breaking abilities, which he used to 
invade the original product manufacturer’s markets can now offer the same original 
product manufacturer access to new markets (Arrunada, 2006).   
 
HEIGHTENED COMPETITION 
Few manufacturing companies still consider manufacturing an essential part of their business.  
Traditional brand owners, what we know today as original product manufacturer, prefers to focus 
on product research, design, and sales leaving production to the new specialists – the contract 
manufacturers.  Contract manufacturing involves outsourcing an entire manufacturing process to 
the point where, in many instances, none of an original product manufacturer’s employees would 
have physically touched the product they are marketing.  This practice began a few decades ago 
with the manufacture of the first IBM PCs but some good time passed before it reached every 
day products, such as, toys, clothing, foot-wear, beer and pharmaceuticals.  Today even the 
automobile industry has embraced it.  For example, Austria’s Magna Steyr assembles cars for 
Mercedes, BMW and Saab.  In Nigeria, the Peugeot Automobile Assembly plant in Kaduna 
contracts out part of its assembly functions to experienced private automobile technicians 
(Arrunada, 2006).  The increasing use of contract manufacturing by producers to produce various 
types of products has heightened competition in some industries in four ways: 
 
1.  The creation of new companies:    Contract manufacturing facilitates the creation of 
new firms and divisions.  Businesses that outsource do not have to raise, invest, and risk the 
capital necessary to develop their own production facilities.  Thus, they can by-pass the 
traditional deterrents to entering new markets.  Indeed any firm even one selling low volumes, 
can decrease its unit costs simply by retaining the contract manufacturer with the biggest scale.  
2. The creation of new brands:    Contract manufacturer’s evolving situation encourages 
them to develop their own brands.  It happens as follows:  As contract manufacturers reach 
efficient scale, their cost levels converge.  At the same time, the products they make begin to 
commoditize. In response, contract manufacturers will attempt to regain a sustainable 
competitive advantage by undertaking the value-adding activities that their patrons have handled 
themselves, such as, Research and Development and Marketing.  If contract manufacturers find  
 
 
 
out that they cannot get all the knowledge they need to sell and brand a new product from 
customers, they can purchase entire division owned by the original product manufacturers.  
Taiwan-based BenQ did just that, buying Siemens’s mobile phone business in 2005.  By doing 
so,  BenQ acquired not only Siemens’s intellectual property but also many decades worth of 
Siemens’s managerial experience, its highly-developed talent pool, its widely-known brands and 
its global operations platform.  Once they have achieved manufacturing mastery, contract 
manufacturers can begin innovating.  This is something they have been doing for some time 
(Arrunada, 2006).  
3. Movement up the value chain:    The most powerful retailers and distributors can 
engage the largest, most efficient contract manufacturers to produce (under the retailers’ or 
distributors’ own name-plates) items equal in quality with those produced by the original product 
manufacturers.  These products share shelf space with the original product manufacturers’ 
products but sell at only half the price.  Contract manufacturer Solectron developed its 
manufacturing expertise in the course of working for IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Mitsubishi.  
Later a distributor asked Solectron to custom build PCs servers and other computer equipment 
under its own brands.  Retailers, too, such as Best Buy, Carrefour, Sears, and Wal-Mart are 
selling electronic products under their own brands, thereby diluting original product 
manufacturer’s marketing clout.  Contract manufacturers that have established their own brands 
suffer as well because their products have difficulty improving on the retailers’ quality, 
innovativeness and pricing.  However, if an enterprising contract manufacturer threatened to stop 
making items for a retailer, it would only drive its client into the arms of another contract 
manufacturer – one that could translate the additional business into improved or even superior 
economies of scale. 
4. Leakage of intellectual property:    Contract manufacturing puts the original product 
manufacturer’s proprietary intangible assets into play.  A contract manufacturer can exploit, for 
the benefit of his own brands the knowledge he acquired in the course of working for a given 
original product manufacturer.  The contract manufacturer can also transfer this knowledge to 
other client original product manufacturers.  Such leakage may occur even if the contract 
manufacturer does not do anything more than assembling components made by others.  For 
instance, three dimensional scanning, computer-aided design, and computer-aided manufacturing 
allow companies to copy in a matter of hours components that may have taken years to design.  
The potential for abuse is very high in contract manufacturing. 
 
AN INEVITABLE RELATIONSHIP 
Contract manufacturing is inevitable, though it entails inescapable hazards some of which are 
discussed below: 
 
 
 
 
First of all, original product manufacturers that embrace contract manufacturing can reduce their 
direct costs even if the number of units they sell is well below the level otherwise required to 
achieve meaningful economies of scale. Consider Flextronics: The contract manufacturer’s plant 
in Mexico, can assemble for Royal Philips Electronics a device for connecting TV sets to the 
internet at very low unit cost because it is simultaneously producing a similar device for Sony on 
an adjacent production line.  In turn, working for many original product manufacturers gives the 
contract manufacturer the revenue to keep making essential investments in factory automation.   
It would be more difficult for IBM, Hewlett-Packard, or contract manufacturer Sanmina to 
obtain equivalent economies of scale if their products were made in their own factories, and if 
those factories produced exclusively for their own brands.  
Second, contract manufacturing allows the original product manufacturer to concentrate on his 
most profitable activities – Research and Development, for instance, or sales and marketing.  
IBM certainly had the money and the knowledge to invest in factory automation and the 
company was glad that its relationship with Sanmina let it match Dell’s prices.  But IBM’s points 
of difference are its outstanding engineering and services.  These are forms of specialization that 
outsourcing had made possible. 
Third, firms can communicate and coordinate among themselves more efficiently than ever 
before.  Consequently, the economic logic that once impelled original product manufacturers to 
perform almost every specialized function in-house no longer applies.  The internet is driving 
most of these efficiencies, as are the standardized production methods, management procedures, 
electronic communication protocols, and digital design formats promoted by the International 
Organization for Standardization, a Federation of National Standard Bodies.  HP, for instance, 
can use technologies, such as, electronic data interchange to transmit specifications directly from 
its design department to machines and robots at a contract manufacturer’s plant.  Such measures 
free the original product manufacturer to separate his innovation activities from his production 
activities. 
Fourth, Flexible manufacturing systems allow original product manufacturer to replace one 
product with another on short notice.  Velvet Automotive, for example, was able to start 
assembling Porsche Boxster vehicle within seven months of landing the production deal with the 
auto-maker.  And Ford makes three different chassis in its factories, each of which can 
accommodate nine different car models, allowing the company to shift production rapidly to the 
models generating the greatest market demands.  
Finally, the combination of standardization and flexible manufacturing lets original product 
manufacturer to replace under-achieving or uncooperative contract manufacturer about as easily 
as they can replace ebbing products.  The reciprocal nature of these relationships – and, 
conversely, the ability of either party to withdraw at the first sign of a hold-up by its partner – 
makes them easy to embrace.  Leading original product manufacturers cannot afford to retreat to  
 
 
 
the safety of vertical integration; the benefits of specialization are too great.  The better 
alternative is to master the present stage of outsourcing’s development while guarding against 
opportunistic, self-serving conduct by contract manufacturers and other partners (Chopra, 2004). 
 
HOW TO COPE WITH CONTRACT MANUFACTURING 
The original contract manufacturer has no choice but to co-exist with the contract manufacturer.  
Fortunately, a few strategies (or defensive moves) are available to assist the master producer 
(original product manufacturer) to cope with the dangers inherent in the relationship between 
him and his agent producer (the contract manufacturer).  Some of these defensive strategies are 
discussed below: 
Be careful what you outsource:   Processes that are part of an original product manufacturer’s 
core competencies or that embody critical corporate assets should not be outsourced at all.  
Moreover, a company that has outsourced all its manufacturing jobs will in time lose most of its 
manufacturing knowledge, which, if nothing else, it needs to oversee and monitor the work of its 
contract manufacturer.  One might expect that managers would be aware of the risk of 
externalizing core competencies.  Why then do they seem so eager to outsource the same core 
competencies?  The answer lies in several countervailing influences.  First is management’s 
penchant for off-loading tangible assets in order to raise the company’s return on assets and 
return on investment, and to be richly rewarded for doing so.  Furthermore, by downsizing the 
workforce, managers can usually improve productivity ratios and avoid long and arduous 
negotiations with trade unions (Arrunada, 2006). 
Tie the relationship to prevailing circumstances:   When an original product manufacturer’s 
product is not novel and unique, its degree of innovativeness, complexity, and maturity in the 
market place should dictate the duration of the relationship between the contract manufacturer 
and the original product manufacturer.  If a product novelty and complexity require a contract 
manufacturer to devote time and other resources to mastering its manufacture, the contract 
manufacturer will need the inducement of a long-term contract to make those investments.         
A long-term contract will also protect the original product manufacturer’s own investment in the 
contract manufacturer’s mastery of the production process.  In situations where the original 
product manufacturer’s product is novel and complex, it becomes nearly impossible for the 
original product manufacturer to quickly replace the contract manufacturer.  
Advantage of a long-term contract:   A long-term contract is valuable because it hinders the 
contract manufacturer from abandoning the original product manufacturer or introducing   
prohibitive terms as the price of remaining to serve the original product manufacturer.  An 
additional consideration for an original product manufacturer is what a contract manufacturer 
will do with the original product manufacturer’s intellectual property when the two parties are no 
longer legally bound to each other.  The contracts that are drawn up to anticipate and deal with 
such eventualities cannot avoid being complex themselves, though the cost and difficulty 
involved in preparing them is justified by the seriousness of the stakes (Lysons, 2003).                  
 
When to prepare a contract of shorter duration:  In a situation where the original product 
manufacturer can easily switch contract manufacturers because the product is simple to make or 
has been around long enough to have become generic, a contract of shorter duration would be 
practical – even advantageous – for the original product manufacturer.  In such cases, nothing 
should prevent an original product manufacturer from pursuing more attractive terms from a 
different contract manufacturer, or vice versa.  In 1999, DaimlerChrysler (then doing business as 
Daimler-Benz) asked contact manufacturer Magna Styr to assemble its Mercedes – Benz M-
Class SUV.  The first unit left the factory within only eight months of the initial venture 
agreement.  In that case, a contract of limited duration was all both parties needed to protect their 
investments.  Organizational arrangements between original product manufacturer and contract 
manufacturer range from one-off contracts – known as market agreements – to more 
interdependent and on-going pacts, such as, framework arrangements, joint ventures, and other 
kinds of partnerships.  A market agreement which might or might not be renewable, would 
involve the manufacture of a distinct or particular type of product.  The market agreement will 
contain very precise technical and design details.  By contrast, a framework arrangement could 
require the contract manufacturer to produce several related models of a product in a given year 
(Lysons, 2003).     
Turnkey contract and Shelter agreement:   There are two varieties of short-term agreement.  
Elamex, a contract manufacturer of electronic components, lets customers choose either a 
turnkey contract or a shelter agreement.  In the former arrangement, an Elamex customer shares 
the assembly line with other customers, each pays Elamex according to the number of units the 
company has produced for it.  In the latter arrangement, a portion of the plant is dedicated to the 
production of a given customer’s products and the customer pays a proportional share of the 
overhead, even bringing in its own managers to oversee processes.  Because Elamex lacks design 
capabilities, it enters into few long-term alliances.  It follows that the company prefers to work 
with experienced manufacturers rather than start-ups (Arrunada, 2006). 
Why strategic alliances devolve into market-agreement relationships:  Curiously, many 
strategic alliances end up devolving into temporary market-agreement relationships.  This 
happens for three main reasons:  First, many original product manufacturters seem to lose tract of 
the ultimate purpose of their long-term arrangements and start pressing contract manufacturers 
hard fort savings.  As a result, the contract manufacturers begin to feel that their investments in 
learning how to make and improve a specialized or unique product will not generate a return.  
Perhaps understandably, contract manufacturers under this pressure shed whatever qualms they 
may have had about, for example, selling directly to the original product manufacturer’s 
customers.  This is an especially dangerous development for the original product manufacturer 
when it cannot easily find another capable contract manufacturer – one of the main reasons for 
forming a long-term partnership in the first place.  A second reason for the devolution of 
strategic alliance into temporary market-agreement relationships is the eventual devaluation of  
 
 
whatever was new and unique about the product.  This problem is especially pronounced in the 
high-tech arena, where products have such short life spans.  The third reason strategic alliances  
weaken is the increasing modularization of components.  Automation demands fewer judgments 
calls and less improvisation from workers.  And assembly has become simpler for contract 
manufacturers now that original product manufacturers are transferring ever large portions of 
manufacturing jobs from contract manufacturers to suppliers, which are responsible for tu5rning 
parts into a single piece of equipment, such as, the seat of a car.  Both developments make it less 
important for contract manufacturers to have special skills and knowledge (Arrunada, 2006). 
Give trustworthy partners their freedom:   Original product manufacturers should seek close 
relationships with trustworthy contract manufacturers to minimize the risk of intellectual 
property leaks and protect their investments. Such closeness would have the incidental benefit of 
making contract manufacturers dependent on original product manufacturers for funding and 
technical guidance.  But such relationships should not be exclusive, otherwise original product 
manufacturers will become isolated from industry innovators. 
Long-term relationship preferable in non-commodity situation:  In non-commodity 
situations, original product manufacturers and contract manufacturers should commit themselves 
to long-term relationships so that their investments will have enough time to pay off.  Naturally, 
the greater the duration of a contract, the more contingencies there are that can arise over its 
course, and the less predictable those contingencies become.  Consequently, such contracts must 
be highly-detailed, with the meanings of terms fully elaborated so that nothing is ambiguous and 
nothing is misunderstood.  How then does an original product manufacturer foster a contact 
manufacturer’s good faith and commitment to the alliance when the contract manufacturer has 
other masters as well?  An original product manufacturer might begin by trying to gain a sense of 
the prospects for long term trust.  The best way to do this is to examine a contract manufacturer’s 
past record and behaviour; that might mean talking to other original product manufacturers, trade 
association representatives and the contract manufacturer’s suppliers. An original product 
manufacturer can also investigate the contract manufacturer’s record of commercial disputes 
(McLean, 2003).    
Watch out for betrayal attitude:  If a contract manufacturer tries to persuade you to retain his 
services by offering to share other clients’ trade secrets or intellectual property with you, it is a 
fair guess that, somewhere down the road, the contract manufacturer will do the same thing with 
your intellectual property in his relationship with another original product manufacturer.  Be very 
careful with such “willing to serve” contract manufacturer (McLean, 2003).  Even if a contract 
manufacturer’s good intentions have been established, an original product manufacturer must 
still determine reliability on his servant manufacturer. Before Toyota retains a supplier, for 
instance, it scrutinizes the supplier’s production process and cost structure.  After the supplier  
 
 
 
 
has been selected, the auto-makes sends him monthly questionnaire eliciting a performance 
history – quality and quantity of outputs, timeliness of delivery, the occurrence of any irregular 
incidents.  Toyota’s engineers may them spend several months at the supplier’s facilities using 
the information obtained to solve problems and improve processes.  
And finally, an original product manufacturer needs to practice good communication.  This 
involves more than just conducting surveillance and reacting to the responses it engenders.  Both 
sides need to share their goals for the alliance and to agree on norms, values and procedures.  
Exchanging personal helps facilitate those things.  Original product manufacturers not only can 
send their engineers to contract manufacturers’ facilities, but can also create “guest engineer” 
programmes, whereby original product manufacturers send their design engineers to contract 
manufacturers’ offices for two to three years.  An original product manufacturer whose product’s 
commercial viability rests on proprietary technology and processes needs to be close to his 
contract manufacturer to know the business well.  The original product manufacturer must take 
steps, both at the inception of the partnership and throughout its course to ensure that the contract 
manufacturer’s competence, currency of knowledge and good faith remain intact at all times 
(Arrunada, 2006).      
Fighting contract manufacturer’s disloyalty:   The original product manufacturer can fight 
contract manufacturer’s disloyalty by deepening distributors’ and customers’ loyalty.  It may be 
that the contract manufacturers have certain advantages, such as, superior manufacturing 
prowess a broader variety of products to offer and lower costs being the most important.  But the 
rise of contract manufacturing has also brought with it some challenges for contract 
manufacturers that decide to retail the products they make.  Original product manufacturers can 
strengthen their ties with customers by offering rewards or special discounts to those that buy 
products frequently, by personalizing customer relationships and by providing strong technical 
support.  Some original product manufacturers advertise professional products directly to end 
users in the hope that the end users will express a preference to the actual purchasers.  
Fundamentally, however, customer loyalty must rest on what distinguishes an original product 
manufacturer’s products from those of his competitors.  Loyalty cannot be based on low prices 
since consumers looking for the best price will be perpetually ready to switch – and contract 
manufacturers are almost always in a better position than the original product manufacturers to 
offer the best price.  The same thing goes for quality, which contract manufacturers’ operational 
excellence assures and product range which is a feature of contract manufacturer’s scale.  In fact, 
the products contract manufacturers provide to other brands will be similar in quality and cost 
precisely because they were made by the same company.  By contrast, a contract manufacturer 
that made unique products for a given original product manufacturer would be tied down by a 
long-term agreement which would remove him as a competitive threat.   
 
 
 
 
Re-building distributors’ loyalty:   Original product manufacturers can also try to re-build 
distributors’ loyalty.  Distributors may be unusually receptive to contract manufacturers’ 
overtures because they resent being squeezed by original product manufacturers seeking short-
term savings.  Even in cases where original product manufacturers act generously, distributors’ 
fears of disintermediation and ultimate replacement by electronic channels tempt them to 
embrace whichever company that provides them with fair treatment and long-lasting 
relationships.  Original product manufacturers that make credible commitments to distributors, 
though these may entail higher costs, can help tie the distributors to the original product 
manufacturers’ brands and keep aggressive contract manufacturers at bay.  These commitments 
may include; paying to train a distributor’s personnel in servicing and repairing the original 
product manufacturer’s products, underwriting the cost of a processing system fitted to both 
parties’ requirements or incorporating the distributor’s identity into an original product 
manufacturer’s marketing campaigns.  The last commitment in particular should help discourage 
the distributor from thinking about becoming the brand himself. Original product manufacturers 
might also want to consider granting a distributor territorial exclusivity, which would improve 
the distributor’s revenues and encourage him to specialize in the original product manufacturer’s 
products (Chopra, 2004).   
 
RESCUE STRATEGIES WHEN THE UNEXPECTED HAPPENS 
A dishonest and ambitious product manufacturer can turn to a tiger producer overnight to 
challenge his master (the original product manufacturer) as a competitor on the same product 
brand.  When this unexpected scenario emerges, experts recommend the following extra survival 
strategies to be followed by the original product manufacturer: 
(a)  Giving special incentives to old customers 
Extra incentives could be worked out for the key customers who are not being poached by the 
former contract manufacturer.  The incentive may include, special discounts, free delivery 
services and longer trade credit duration.  The incentive could also include premium gifts, such 
as, free branded T-shirts and caps, and drinking glasses.    
(b) Improving the quality of the product brand 
The original product manufacturer can improve the quality of his product and its packaging in 
order to add new value and create new attraction.  These quality improvement approaches will, 
however, mean additional cost but increase in the volume of sales will, in the long run, justify the 
additional cost 
(c) Aggressive advertising 
Undertaking aggressive advertising could create fresh awareness of the product brand.  This will 
be more effective in a situation where the original product manufacturer has made new changes 
to the original product.  It is important for the advertisement to emphasize the distinctive features 
of the product and other selling points that would interest buyers.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
If we put contract manufacturing on the scale of values, chances are that the gains would 
outweigh the losses.  As long as technological innovations keep increasing, the benefits of 
specialization, contract manufacturing will continue to be a popular choice for original product 
manufacturers.  Unfortunately, managers’ incentives encourage a wholesale, uncritical approach 
to decisions about whether to outsource, which products to outsource, which contract 
manufacturers to engage, and in what form – market agreement, a strategic alliance, or 
something in-between.  When original product manufacturers share sensitive intellectual 
property with contract manufacturers, it is important that the relationship be trusting and close 
but not so close that contract manufacturers lose touch with the market and other original product 
manufacturers’ contributions.  Since these techniques are not infallible, original product 
manufacturers should treat their customers and distributors well enough that they become 
immune to the appeals of upstart contract manufacturers, and they should spread their risk by 
diversifying their portfolio of products.  
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